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Privacy is widely recognised in international and regional human rights law as a fundamental 
right that is necessary for the maintenance of liberal, democratic societies. This importance 
acknowledges that in addition to protecting an individual’s personal life from public scrutiny, 
privacy protection can facilitate individuals’ enjoyment of their political rights such as the 
right to religion, the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of assembly. In 
recent decades, protection of the right to privacy within the UK has evolved to be a 
significant issue as the state has become a ‘world leader’ in using technologies such as 
biometric databases and surveillance cameras, and private actors, notably the media, have 
also used technological advances to gather information on individuals without their consent. 
Despite the importance of the right to privacy and the growing pressures on 
individuals’ enjoyment of this right, there is at present no comprehensive privacy law within 
Northern Ireland or the rest of the UK. Historically, the law of Northern Ireland offered only 
piecemeal protection for privacy, which a person could only rely upon indirectly. For 
example, suing someone for breach of confidence was possible provided that some private 
information had been misused or for defamation if material was published that was damaging 
to an individual’s reputation. It was also possible to succeed in a claim of trespass or 
nuisance, particularly if private property had been invaded or the intrusion had been insistent 
and repeated. Similarly, individuals could seek some legal remedies where public authorities 
exceeded statutory regulations granting them the powers to breach individual privacy in 
specific circumstances defined as being in the national interest. However, these areas of tort 
law, equity law and public law protect distinct and specific interests rather than providing a 
general right to privacy. 
With the full entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 in October 2000, the 
right to privacy contained in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
became a direct part of Northern Ireland’s law. Thus, for the first time, people in Northern 
Ireland could directly enforce their right to privacy against public authorities within domestic 
courts, rather than having to seek remedies at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
However, the Human Rights Act 1998 is not directly enforceable against private bodies, such 
as the press. Instead, as with the pre-Human Rights Act era, individuals can still invoke their 
right to privacy against private actors only by relying on an existing cause of action, such as 
breach of confidence, which the courts can then interpret in light of Article 8 on the basis that 
the courts themselves are public authorities. As a result, privacy law in Northern Ireland 
remains a patchwork of the following legal provisions: 
 
⎯ general statutory provisions, such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data 
Protection Act 1998; 
⎯ statutory regulations governing specific circumstances in which the state can lawfully 
intrude on an individual’s privacy; 
⎯ common law rules, such as the laws on breach of confidence, defamation and 
trespass; and 
⎯ systems of informal regulation, such as the Press Complaints Commission. 
 
Given the diversity of distinct legal provisions relating to the right to privacy in Northern 
Ireland, this chapter will not seek to survey each of them individually. Rather it will begin by 
exploring definitions of the right to privacy on the basis of Article 8. In the following 
sections, it will explore the extent to which people in Northern Ireland have access to 
remedies for violations of the right to privacy by public authorities and private actors. The 
latter section will focus primarily on the media because the actions of print media have 
produced voluminous case law on the right to privacy in recent years. For a complete picture 
this chapter should be read alongside Chapter 9 on freedom of expression and Chapter 10 on 
rights to access information. 
 
What	  is	  the	  right	  to	  privacy?	  
 
The basis for the most general protection of the right to privacy in Northern Ireland’s law is 
supplied by Article 8 of the ECHR, which reads: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
From this provision, we can see that although the term privacy is not defined, the Convention 
nonetheless seeks to protect an individual’s privacy within broad, multiple and overlapping 
spheres of life. Each of these areas will be explored below. The right to privacy enshrined in 
Article 8 is not an absolute right. Instead, the Strasbourg case law has indicated that public 
authorities are permitted to limit the right to privacy provided that the interference is in 
accordance with the aims set out in Article 8(2). As a result of the incorporation of Article 8 
into Northern Ireland’s law through the Human Rights Act 1998, where a public body 
interferes with an individual’s right to privacy outside these limits, it is acting unlawfully and 
can be sued by the victim. 
 
Respect	  for	  private	  life	  
  
The ECtHR has described the right to a private life as ‘a broad term not susceptible to 
exhaustive definition’ (Peck v UK, 2003, para 57). However, from the case law it can be 
determined that the Court views the right as ‘encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an 
individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal autonomy, personal 
development and to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world’. (Evans v UK, 2006, para 71) 
The key areas within this right are protections for personal information, personal 
autonomy and physical integrity. 
 
Personal information 
The protection of personal information is often regarded as the core of ensuring respect for 
private life. It has produced a substantial body of case law from Strasbourg relating to the 
ways in which public authorities gather, store and use personal data (eg Murray v UK, 1994). 
This case law has focused on ensuring that states collect ‘particularly sensitive or intimate 
data’, such as that relating to sexuality (Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK, 2000) or health (Z v 
Finland), or engage in covert surveillance (Kopp v Switzerland, 1998), only when there are 
compelling grounds to do so. The ECtHR has further found that respect for private life entails 
not just a negative obligation on the state to refrain from interfering in an individual’s 
personal life, but also a positive obligation to take actions ‘to secure effective respect for 
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves’ (Von 
Hannover v Germany, 2004, para 57). However, states are afforded a ‘wide margin of 
appreciation’ in this area (Mosley v UK, 2011, para 108). 
Within Northern Ireland, the Data Protection Act 1998 is the primary source of legal 
protection in relation to data processing, whether by public authorities or private actors. The 
Act sets out the circumstances in which data can be processed and establishes eight principles 
for data protection. These require personal data to be: 
 
⎯ processed fairly and lawfully; 
⎯ obtained for specified and lawful purposes; 
⎯ adequate, relevant and not excessive; 
⎯ accurate and up to date; 
⎯ not kept any longer than necessary; 
⎯ processed in accordance with the rights of the individual(s) involved; 
⎯ kept securely; and 
⎯ not transferred to any other country unless adequate protection is in place there. 
 
The Data Protection Act also creates a regulatory framework under which the Information 
Commissioner monitors compliance with the Act by individuals and organisations engaged in 
data collection. Failure to comply with this framework is a criminal offence. See Chapter 10 
for more information on the Act.  
In Northern Ireland the personal information of individuals who are in receipt of 
health or social care should be handled in accordance with the Code of Practice on Protecting 
the Confidentiality of Service User Information, which was issued in 2012 by the Privacy 
Advisory Committee of the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety. 
Institutions wishing to make use of such personal information in Northern Ireland cannot 
benefit from the protection afforded by section 251 of the National Health Service Act 2006, 
which allows research to be authorised in certain circumstances even where an individual’s 
consent has not been given. No equivalent legislation applies in Northern Ireland.   
Personal autonomy 
The right to a private life has also been interpreted by the ECtHR as embracing personal 
autonomy and personal development (eg Pretty v UK, 2002, para 61, where the Court said 
that a person’s right to choose when to die engaged Article 8). This means that information 
concerning one’s gender, sexual orientation and sexual life is considered to be private. For 
example, in Dudgeon v UK (1981), a case which went to Strasbourg from Northern Ireland, 
the Court found that legislation criminalising homosexual intercourse in Northern Ireland 
violated Article 8 as it prevented an individual exercising autonomy in his personal sexual 
preferences, and the state’s justification for such a prohibition was disproportionate to the 
impact it had on the individual. In addition, personal autonomy can relate not just to the 
extent to which others intrude on an individual’s choices but also to the extent to which an 
individual can retain control over his or her own body. The ECtHR has explored this issue in 
relation to questions of abortion (Evans v UK, 2006; A, B and C v Ireland, 2010) and assisted 
suicide (Pretty v UK, 2002). In the former cases, the Court found that states were entitled to a 
wide ‘margin of appreciation’ on the question of abortion as ‘there is no consensus within the 
Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at 
stake or as to the best means of protecting it’ (para 232). In relation to assisted suicide it 
found that Article 8 could be engaged with regards to ‘quality of life’ and the court was ‘not 
prepared to exclude that this constitutes an interference with her right to respect for private 
life’ (paras 52–54). However, the Court then ruled that: ‘It is primarily for States to assess the 
risk and the likely incidence of abuse if the general prohibition on assisted suicides were 
relaxed or if exceptions were to be created.’ It therefore held that the UK’s criminalisation of 
assisted suicide was not disproportionate (para 74). 
 
Bodily integrity 
Finally, the right to a private life has been interpreted to include bodily integrity. While this 
incorporates an individual’s right to freedom of choice regarding control over his or her own 
body, it also includes a right to freedom from physical intrusion, such as corporal punishment 
(eg Costello-Roberts v UK, 1995). In Northern Ireland’s law, the state is empowered in 
certain circumstances to intrude upon bodily integrity. For example, under section 55 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989, the police are allowed to take intimate 
samples and to conduct strip searches, where they have reasonable suspicion that an 
individual may be carrying Class A drugs or objects that may cause harm to anyone. 
However, such searches must be conducted in accordance with requirements of Article 8. 
 
Respect	  for	  family	  life	  
 
The ECtHR has interpreted the right to family life as offering protection to many different 
types of families. For example, in X, Y and Z v UK (1997), the Court found that the UK had 
not violated Article 8 when it refused to recognise a female to male transsexual as the father 
of a child who was conceived through artificial insemination from a donor. The Court did 
nonetheless conclude that due to the father’s role in the child’s life a family relationship 
between them did exist. 
As with other elements of the right to privacy, the European Court has found that the 
right to a family life creates not only negative obligations on states to refrain from 
interference but also positive obligations to allow people to lead a family life. For example, in 
Nurzynski v Poland (2011), the Court found that where a person is being held in detention, 
the authorities are required to enable him or her to maintain contact with his close family. 
Furthermore, in Abou v Romania (2011), the Court held that the state violated Article 8 by 
forcing the applicant to leave Romania, where the public authorities had not acted in 
accordance with domestic law. 
 
Respect	  for	  the	  home	  
 The right to respect for the home clearly encompasses an individual’s dwelling, but the 
ECtHR has also expanded this concept to include a person’s office used for professional 
purposes (Heino v Finland, 2011). Where this right applies, it relates to an individual’s right 
to occupy their home and their right not to be expelled from it. In addition, individuals have 
the right to privacy within their homes (see, eg Bisir v Moldova, 2011). However, in Northern 
Ireland’s law, hundreds of pieces of legislation permit public authorities to enter private 
homes. These aim to protect the public welfare and prevent crime and include such laws as 
the Firearms Act 1968, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the Criminal Law Act 1977, the 
Mental Health Act 1983, the Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984, the Police and 
Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989 and the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. Within these 
laws there are inconsistencies relating to whether officials need to show warrants, whether 
they are permitted to use force, and what kind of penalties can be imposed on those who 
refuse them entry. 
 Respect	  for	  correspondence	  
 
Respect for correspondence applies, of course, to postal correspondence but today can also 
apply to other forms of communications such as emails, faxes or social networking. To date, 
case law from the ECtHR has focused on the right of a detainee to correspond with the 
outside world. For example, in Milosevic v Serbia (2011), the applicant complained that the 
prison authorities were opening and stamping all his legal correspondence, which the Court 
found not to be in accordance with the law. Within Northern Ireland, as will be discussed 
below, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 governs when and how some public 
authorities can intercept personal communications as part of their investigatory or 
intelligence functions. 
 
Privacy,	  surveillance	  and	  public	  authorities	  
 Although the right to privacy was incorporated into Northern Ireland’s law by the Human 
Rights Act 1998, it has recently come under increasing pressure from the state. Technological 
advances have meant that it is now cheaper and easier for public authorities to collect, 
process and share considerable amounts of personal data, and the state can now use a wider 
range of surveillance tools, such as full-body scanners and CCTV cameras. One of the 
practical risks posed by such enormous data collection strategies in which large numbers of 
public officials may have access to information is that the data will not be kept secure. In 
recent years, several incidents have occurred in which copies of official databases containing 
the personal data of thousands of individuals have been lost or left in public places. In 
addition, state surveillance strategies often provoke political concerns as they could, for 
example, impinge on peaceful public protests. In such contexts, intrusions on the right to 
privacy could have negative repercussions on individuals’ ability to exercise their political 
rights. 
Under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, ‘it is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right’. Furthermore, where 
persons believe that a public authority has violated their rights, section 7(1) permits them to 
‘bring proceedings against the authority ... in the appropriate court or tribunal’ and to rely 
directly on their convention rights in those proceedings. When addressing complaints about 
interference with Article 8 rights courts are required to determine: (1) whether the 
interference was conducted in accordance with domestic law; (2) whether it was necessary to 
address public security or well-being; and (3) whether the measures taken were proportionate 
to the intrusion on the individual’s right to privacy. In this way, it is possible for the courts to 
find that an individual’s right to privacy was violated, but that such an intrusion was 
necessary and proportionate in the given circumstances.  
This approach requires the courts to determine whether the public authorities 
appropriately balanced the rights of the individual against the public interest. How to strike 
this balance will depend in part on the severity of the public interest needs invoked. The state 
may find it easier to justify interferences based on national security (see Leander v Sweden, 
1987, paras 58–67), than on crime prevention (see Funke v France, 1993, paras 53–57). 
Where a state interferes with privacy rights, it must ensure that there are safeguards to protect 
individuals from arbitrary interference, that the interference is conducted in accordance with 
the law, and that strict limits are placed on the power conferred (Camenzind v Switzerland, 
1997, para 45). Assessments of the appropriateness of safeguards will measure the level of 
intrusion on an individual’s privacy in relation to the importance of the national interests that 
the intrusion seeks to protect. This chapter will now explore how the balance has been struck 
in recent years in relation to: (1) stop and search powers; (2) the use of personal and 
biometric databases; (3) the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV); and (4) the interception 
of communications and surveillance. 
 
Stop	  and	  search	  powers	  
 
Within the law of Northern Ireland, police officers are empowered to stop and search any 
person or vehicle under article 3 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989 
provided that the officer has ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that he [or she] will find 
stolen or prohibited articles’. In addition, under the Terrorism Act 2000, section 89 empowers 
police officers to stop a person for as long as is necessary to question him or her about his or 
her identity and movements and what he or she knows about a recent explosion, a recent 
event endangering life, or a person killed or injured in a recent explosion or incident. If a 
person refuses to stop or answer questions, it is a criminal offence. Similar powers are 
provided in section 21 of the Justice and Security (NI) Act 2007, which grants both police 
officers and members of the armed forces the power to stop and question individuals about 
their identity and movements. According to statistics produced by the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland, the stop and search powers under these three pieces of legislation were used 
against 45,394 persons in a two-year period between 2009 and 2011. 
The intrusion of privacy resulting from a similar power (conferred by section 44 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000) has triggered complaints to the ECtHR. In Gillan and Quinton v UK 
(2010) the applicants complained after being stopped and searched near to an arms fair in 
London in 2003. They initially challenged the police action through an application for 
judicial review, but they lost in the House of Lords (R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for 
the Metropolis, 2006). When the case reached Strasbourg, the ECtHR found that, although 
the stop and search powers were governed by domestic law 
 
the use of the coercive powers conferred by the legislation to require an individual to submit 
to a detailed search of his person, his clothing and his personal belongings amounts to a clear 
interference with the right to respect for private life. Although the search is undertaken in a 
public place, this does not mean that Article 8 is inapplicable. Indeed, in the Court’s view, the 
public nature of the search may, in certain cases, compound the seriousness of the interference 
because of an element of humiliation and embarrassment (para 63). 
 
The Court further considered whether the existing legal framework created sufficient 
safeguards to protect citizens. It found that ‘there is a clear risk of arbitrariness in the grant of 
such a broad discretion to the police officer’, and noted that such broad discretion, 
particularly where there is no requirement for ‘reasonable suspicion’, could result in the 
discriminatory use of the powers against minority populations or their misuse against 
peaceful protestors (para 85). Following this decision, the Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial 
Order) 2011 was introduced in order to provide greater safeguards in the use of stop and 
search powers within anti-terrorism legislation throughout the UK. It is due to be replaced by 
a provision in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. 
 
Personal	  and	  biometric	  databases	  
 
Public authorities within Northern Ireland and the UK, as in other developed countries, have 
increasingly constructed databases containing personal and biometric information. These 
databases are designed to facilitate law enforcement, combat terrorism, and enhance public 
sector service delivery. In addition, where public functions are outsourced to private actors, 
public authorities may share this personal data with private companies. The ECtHR 
considered the powers of state to collect personal data in Leander v Sweden (1987), where the 
applicant complained that his personal details had been stored on a secret police register for 
national security purposes, that this information had been shared with the navy so that the 
navy could vet employees, and that he had no opportunity to challenge the information. The 
Court found that  
 
in a system applicable to citizens generally, ... the law has to be sufficiently clear in its terms 
to give them an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on 
which the public authorities are empowered to resort to this kind of secret and potentially 
dangerous interference with private life (para 51). 
 
In this case, the Court held that the relevant domestic law contained detailed information on 
the procedures to be followed by the police when sharing personal data. When considering 
whether the measure was necessary, the Court noted ‘the risk that a system of secret 
surveillance for the protection of national security poses of undermining or even destroying 
democracy on the ground of defending it’ (para 60), but it accorded the state a wide ‘margin 
of appreciation’.  
The issue of data sharing by public authorities was considered by the High Court of 
Northern Ireland in Re O’s Judicial Review (2008). This case was brought by a police officer 
who alleged that a decision by the Police Ombudsman to require the Chief Constable to 
provide all medical and occupational health records relating to his medical condition violated 
his right to privacy. The applicant had been involved in shooting dead a member of the public 
and the Police Ombudsman was investigating the event. In reviewing the decision, the High 
Court found that, ‘given the highly personal and sensitive data’ requested by the Police 
Ombudsman, ‘disclosure of that material without his consent would entail an interference 
with his right to respect for private life’ (para 21). The court found that this intrusion was 
pursued for the legitimate aim of crime prevention (para 31), but it had not been carried out in 
a proportionate manner and hence violated Article 8 (para 54). 
The legal authority for the police to take fingerprints and other bodily samples was 
conferred in England and Wales by Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (the 
PACE Act) and in Northern Ireland by Part 6 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 
1989 (the PACE Order). The world’s first National DNA Database was established in 
England in 1995. It was originally designed to contain the DNA records of convicted 
criminals, but its scope has since been considerably widened. By the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001, which applied directly in Northern Ireland as well as in England and Wales, 
the database began to collect samples and data relating to persons who had not been 
prosecuted or who had been prosecuted but acquitted. It was further expanded by the 
Criminal Justice (NI) Order 2004 (mirroring the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for England and 
Wales), which allowed for ‘non-intimate samples’, such as rooted hair or mouth swabs, to be 
taken without consent. The 2003 Order also allowed DNA to be collected from persons who 
had been arrested, even if they were not later charged, and permitted any such sample to be 
retained indefinitely. Part 6 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Amendment) (NI) Order 
2007 made further changes to the police’s powers. Northern Ireland now has its own DNA 
database, records from which are exported to the National DNA Database in England as well 
as being stored in Northern Ireland. By 2009, the Police Service of Northern Ireland held the 
profiles of 103,441 persons on its DNA database. 
The compatibility of the National DNA Database with the ECHR was challenged 
unsuccessfully before the House of Lords in R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
Police (2004), but the case was then taken before the ECtHR as S and Marper v UK (2008) 
and the applicants won. One of the two applicants had been aged 11 when he was arrested for 
an offence for which he was later acquitted and the other had also been arrested but then 
acquitted. Both had had their DNA samples and fingerprints had been taken, and the police 
refused to delete these samples following their acquittals. In reviewing the case, the Court 
found that 
 
the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular 
samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences ... fails to strike 
a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that the respondent State 
has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard. Accordingly, the 
retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to 
respect for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. (para 125) 
 
This decision was later endorsed by the UK Supreme Court in R (GC and C) v Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis (2011), which found that the excessive retention of DNA profiles 
violated Article 8. In addition, in Re BBC (Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 1999) Lord 
Phillips found that Article 8 would be violated by publishing that an individual’s retained 
DNA ‘has been used to link him to the commission of a crime of which he has been 
acquitted’ (para 22). The UK government responded to the ECtHR’s judgment by enacting 
the Crime and Security Act 2010. This established a range of time limits for the retention of 
biometric data depending on the seriousness of the offence, whether it resulted in a 
conviction, and whether the data was collected from a minor. In addition, the Minister of 
Justice in Northern Ireland has launched a public consultation on the deletion after three years 
from the Northern Ireland DNA Database of records relating to people who have been 
charged but not convicted. 
 Closed-­‐circuit	  television	  (CCTV)	  
 
As frequently discussed in the media, the UK currently has a greater number of surveillance 
cameras than any other country. In 2011, research conducted by the Cheshire Constabulary 
estimated that there were 1.85 million CCTV cameras in the UK, a figure that equates to one 
camera for every 32 people. These cameras are operated by the police, local government and 
private organisations. Within Northern Ireland, according to the privacy campaign group Big 
Brother Watch, Belfast City Council alone operated 400 cameras in 2009. CCTV cameras 
have been widely installed for crime prevention and detection, the regulation of anti-social 
behaviour, and surveillance. In addition, speed cameras can match images with information 
in databases containing driver details and facial recognition features in order to ensure that 
drivers who are speeding can be fined. As a result of the prevalence of CCTV, individuals are 
often subject to surveillance without their knowledge. 
Despite the widespread use of CCTV and its potential to intrude on individuals’ right 
to privacy, its use is not currently regulated by a single legal framework. Where CCTV 
cameras are used to collect, process and store data (as opposed to simply displaying 
unrecorded live footage), they are governed by the Data Protection Act 1998, which applies 
to data collected by both public authorities and private actors. In addition, where public 
authorities use CCTV cameras for covert use, they are governed by the Code of Practice on 
Covert Surveillance and Property Interference, issued under section 71 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. However, this does not regulate non-covert use of these 
cameras, or the use of CCTV by private actors. 
The impact of CCTV cameras on the right to privacy was considered by the ECtHR in 
Peck v UK (2003). In this case, the applicant was recorded on CCTV cameras owned by 
Brentwood City Council walking through the city centre carrying a knife, which he had just 
used to try to commit suicide. The Council subsequently shared the footage with a television 
company and the man’s undisguised image was broadcast without his consent on a 
programme watched by 350,000 viewers. In considering the case, the Court found: 
 
The monitoring of the actions of an individual in a public place by the use of photographic 
equipment which does not record the visual data does not, as such, give rise to an interference 
with the individual’s private life. On the other hand, the recording of the data and the 
systematic or permanent nature of the record may give rise to such considerations. (para 59) 
 
The Court further found that the subsequent broadcasting of the event on a television 
programme without the man’s consent or the masking of his image constituted a violation of 
his right to a private life. The Court added that, although the Council’s use of CCTV and the 
sharing of images with a broadcaster were lawful, in this case the impact on the applicant’s 
privacy was disproportionate. The findings in this case illustrate a legal distinction between 
the recording and processing of images, in respect of which an individual’s privacy rights can 
be protected, and the mere observing individuals in public spaces, which may not attract any 
protection. 
 
Interception	  of	  communications	  and	  surveillance	  
 
During the conflict in Northern Ireland, the interception of communications and surveillance 
were commonly used counter-terrorism techniques. In addition, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the UK security services covertly listened to and recorded the telephone conversations of 
trade union members and left-wing politicians, including members of the government (a 
process known as ‘wiretapping’). In Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No 2) 
(1979), an English court confirmed that a person had no right not to have his or her telephone 
tapped by state authorities. There was nothing to make the practice unlawful; therefore, it had 
to be tolerated. Mr Malone then took his case to Strasbourg, where the ECtHR decided in 
1984 that the UK’s law was in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court said that the UK’s 
law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant 
discretion conferred on the public authorities. 
The Interception of Communications Act 1985 was passed in order to comply with 
the ECtHR’s judgment in the Malone case. This Act made it an offence for anyone to 
intercept communications sent by post or by means of a public communications system. 
However, interception remained permissible if it was consented to (eg when someone wishes 
to trace offensive telephone calls) or if it was carried out under a warrant issued by the 
Secretary of State, who must not issue one unless he or she considers it to be necessary in the 
interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or for 
the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK. 
The UK government was forced to introduce further safeguards following the 
ECtHR’s decision in Halford v UK (1997). This case concerned the Merseyside Police 
Authority’s decision to intercept the telephone calls of Ms Halford, an Assistant Chief 
Constable, who had lodged a claim against the authority on the basis that she had been 
refused promotion because of her gender. The ECtHR found that ‘telephone calls made from 
business premises as well as from the home may be covered by the notions of “private life” 
and “correspondence” within the meaning of Article 8(1)’ (para 44). The Court further found 
that for such interference in individuals’ private lives to be considered in accordance with the 
law, the law must be: 
 
sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in 
and conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such secret 
measures. (para 49) 
 
The Court held that the Interception of Communications Act 1985 failed to provide such 
safeguards and hence there had been a violation of Article 8. It recently restated this finding 
in Liberty v UK (2008), which related to the interception of telephone calls between Britain 
and Ireland in the 1990s. As a result of the Halford decision, the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985 and parts of the Police Act 1977 were replaced by the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), which was enacted to try to ensure that the law in 
this area fully complied with the ECHR and with the newly enacted Human Rights Act 1998. 
RIPA permits a wide range of public authorities, including police services and local 
governments, to make requests for surveillance powers. Depending on the public authority 
making the request, there can be directed and intrusive surveillance, and the use of covert 
human intelligence sources, provided these are expressly authorised by designated persons 
such as the police or the security services (ie those bodies listed in Schedule 1 to the Act). 
The authorising persons must believe that the authorisation is necessary in the interests of 
national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the interests 
of the economic well-being of the UK (ss 28(3) and 32(3)). Directed and covert surveillance 
can also be authorised in the interests of public safety, for the purpose of protecting public 
health, for the purpose of assessing any tax or for any other purpose specified in an order 
made by the Secretary of State (s 28(3)). Authorisations of intrusive surveillance granted to 
the police or customs officers have to be approved by a Surveillance Commissioner (s 36), 
and appeals against the decisions of that Commissioner can be taken to the Chief Surveillance 
Commissioner (s 38). RIPA also created an Interception of Communications Commissioner 
(s 57) who is empowered to monitor whether public authorities are using their surveillance 
powers legally and responsibly. According to the Annual Report of the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner, public authorities as a whole submitted 552,500 requests for 
communications data during 2010. On grounds of national security, the Commissioner 
declined to reveal what percentage of these requests related to Northern Ireland, and similar 
restrictions are placed on disclosing the numbers of Foreign Office warrants.  
In Northern Ireland, the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister is 
amongst those who are designated to authorise directed or covert surveillance but not 
intrusive surveillance (s 31) and there is an Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern 
Ireland to keep this function under review (s 61). The surveillance powers regulated by RIPA 
were challenged in the case of Re McE (2009). This related to covert surveillance by the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland of conversations between a lawyer and his clients, who 
were Loyalist paramilitaries. The bugging of the conversations resulted in the lawyer being 
charged with incitement to murder and perverting the course of justice. In considering the 
matter, the House of Lords held that RIPA did permit covert surveillance despite the 
existence of legal professional privilege or statutory rights to consultation with legal 
representatives. However, such surveillance could be permitted only if the safeguards within 
RIPA were adhered to and there was no breach of Article 8. Given the severity of intrusion 
on private legal conversations, the safeguards used had to be those stipulated by section 32 of 
RIPA. 
 
Privacy,	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  the	  media	  
 
During 2011, the phone-hacking scandal involving national newspapers and the debates over 
the use of super-injunctions brought the question of media intrusions on the right to privacy 
firmly into the public spotlight. Traditionally, in order to preserve press freedom, UK 
governments have opted to allow the print media to self-regulate, rather than relying on civil 
or criminal regulation. Individuals who feel that their privacy has been invaded can therefore 
complain to the Press Complaints Commission, a body dominated by media representatives. 
If the complaint is upheld, the Commission can censure the newspaper or journalist and may 
even require its adjudication to be published by the offending paper. However, the 
Commission has no power to fine an offender or to award damages to a complainant. 
Since the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, UK courts have gradually 
supplemented these self-regulatory protections and established a considerable body of case 
law on the application of Article 8 to disputes between private actors. As the following 
paragraphs reveal, the case law to date indicates that when determining whether a private 
actor has breached an individual’s privacy, the courts will ask three questions: do the courts 
have jurisdiction to intervene; is the published information private; and, if so, is its 
publication in the public interest? 
 
Do the courts have jurisdiction? 
As it is primarily binding only on public bodies, the Human Rights Act 1998 is not directly 
enforceable against private actors. However, people can now complain about violations of 
their right to privacy under Article 8 when suing private actors using an existing cause of 
action such as breach of confidence. When such complaints have been made over the past 
decade, UK courts have gradually developed an indirect ‘horizontal’ effect for Article 8 by 
relying on their own obligation under section 6 of the Human Rights Act to act in a manner 
that is compatible with Convention rights, and section 12 of the Act specifically requires the 
courts to balance freedom of expression against the right to privacy. This approach was 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in B and A v C (2002) and then by the 
House of Lords in Campbell v MGN (2004).  
 
Is the information private? 
Traditionally, under the common law, the doctrine of breach of confidence offered some 
protection against the publication of confidential information. However, UK courts and the 
ECtHR have gradually extended this to apply to information where individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. This expectation could arise in relation to the nature of the 
information, the form in which it is kept, or whether it has been disclosed as part of a 
confidential relationship. 
The reinterpretation of the law of confidence began soon after the Human Rights Act 
entered into effect, in the case of Douglas v Hello! (2001). Michael Douglas and Catherine 
Zeta-Jones tried to prevent Hello! from publishing their wedding photographs, which the two 
stars had promised instead to give to OK magazine. In the English Court of Appeal Sedley LJ 
said that ‘we have reached a point at which it can be said with confidence that the law 
recognises and will appropriately protect a right of personal privacy’ (para 110), but the 
majority of the court held that here publication should be permitted and refused to continue 
the interim injunction against Hello!. The two stars later successfully claimed damages from 
Hello! for the breach of confidence, but Lindsay J too found that there was not yet a full-
blown right to privacy. 
The law of confidence was also dramatically employed to protect the right to privacy 
in Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd (2001), where a global injunction 
was granted to prevent the disclosure of any information which could lead to the 
identification of the killers of Jamie Bulger after their release from prison. Dame Elizabeth 
Butler-Sloss held that the information relating to the identification of Venables and 
Thompson required ‘a special quality of protection’ as its disclosure could result in ‘grave 
and possibly fatal consequences’. The decision shows that breach of confidence may occur 
based on the nature of the information alone, rather than the circumstances in which someone 
acquired it. 
It seems, however, that the occurrence of sexual relations per se is not something 
which has to be treated as confidential. In Theakston v MGN Ltd (2002) the judge refused to 
prevent the publication by the Sunday People of photographs of a television presenter 
engaging in sexual acts in a London brothel. In B and A v C (2002), which concerned 
revelations about the extra-marital affairs of a premiership footballer, the Court of Appeal set 
out 15 guidelines to help courts strike a balance between privacy and freedom of expression. 
These stated, for example, that a duty of confidence will arise if the party is in a relationship 
in which he ‘can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected’ and noted that ‘the more 
stable the relationship the greater will be the significance which is attached to it’. 
A landmark decision on the protection of private information was delivered by the 
House of Lords in Campbell v MGN (2004), where Lord Nicholls argued that breach of 
confidence had evolved from relating solely to information that was expressly confidential to 
include any information a person receives which he or she knows or ought to know is fairly 
and reasonably to be regarded as confidential. Indeed he suggested that the tort of breach of 
confidence is now better described as the tort of misuse of private information and that the 
crucial issue is whether ‘the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy’ (para 
21). In the same decision, Lord Hoffmann contended that the tort was now based upon ‘the 
protection of human autonomy and dignity⎯the right to control the dissemination of 
information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people’ 
(para 51).  
This issue was also considered by the ECtHR in Von Hannover v Germany (2004), 
where it found that press photographs of Princess Caroline of Monaco engaging in ‘her daily 
life’ had infringed her privacy. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that ‘there is ... a 
zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within 
the scope of “private life”’ (para 50). It also observed that Princess Caroline exercised no 
official functions and hence the photographs related solely to her private life (para 76). This 
approach went beyond the approach of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN.  
In 2006, in HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd, the Court of Appeal 
found that a travel journal handwritten by Prince Charles was a ‘paradigm example of a 
confidential document’ as it was obviously private and set out the prince’s personal views 
and impressions (para 35). Although the journal was seen by his staff, they were contractually 
obliged to keep the journal’s contents confidential. Likewise, in Ash v McKennitt (2006) an 
English court prevented the disclosure in a book about to be published by Ms Ash of personal 
information about Ms McKennitt, a Canadian folk singer. Ash had learned the information in 
the course of a friendship with McKennitt and whilst being employed by her under a contract 
containing a confidentiality clause. The court held that McKennitt had a ‘legitimate 
expectation’ of protection and respect for her private life, even, on some occasions, in 
relatively public circumstances (para 52). Even the disclosure of ‘anodyne’ or ‘trivial’ 
information, such as details of the interior of McKennitt’s home, could engage Article 8 (para 
58).  
The concept of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ was further endorsed by the 
Court of Appeal in Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd (2007) and by the High Court in 
Murray v Express Newspapers Plc (2007). The latter case concerned unauthorised 
photographs taken of a child by the Sunday Express. In holding that on the facts there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court said (in para 36) that it was relevant to consider: 
 
⎯ the attributes of the claimant; 
⎯ the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged; 
⎯ the place at which it was happening; 
⎯ the nature and purpose of the intrusion; 
⎯ the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred that consent 
was absent; 
⎯ the effect on the claimant; and 
⎯ the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the information came into the 
hands of the publisher. 
 
Courts in Northern Ireland have followed the approach of the English courts. For example, in 
Callaghan v Independent News & Media Ltd (2009), the High Court said that ‘the question as 
to whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is an objective question and a question 
of fact’. The court found that, although under the terms of his release from prison Callaghan 
could not expect privacy from the police, probation service or prison service, he did retain ‘a 
residuum of privacy’, which would need to be balanced against the public interest in 
publishing information about him. The High Court again applied the same criteria in Lee v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd (2010), which was about the publication of information relating 
to the personal life of well-known musician Van Morrison. The court found that the case 
breached the applicant’s reasonable expectations as the disclosed information related to 
private and personal activities and to descriptions of children and the home (para 34). 
 
Is the publication in the public interest? 
If the courts find that private information has been disclosed, they then have to determine 
whether the disclosure was in the public interest. This entails balancing Article 8 protection 
against the protection of the freedom of expression contained in Article 10 of the ECHR (see 
Chapter 9). With the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, the right to freedom of 
expression became a direct part of UK law, and section 12 of that Act outlines requirements 
for UK courts to address if they are considering granting remedies, such as injunctions, which 
would affect freedom of expression. The requirements include having particular regard to the 
extent to which ‘(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public, or (ii) it is, 
or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published’ and to ‘any relevant 
privacy code’. However, under the Human Rights Act neither Article 8 nor Article 10 has 
precedence over the other (Campbell v MGN, 2004, para 55). 
UK courts have engaged in balancing Articles 8 and 10 in numerous cases relating to 
the publishing of personal information by the media, with differing results. In Venables and 
Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd and others (2001), where the disclosure could have 
had severe consequences for the applicants’ security, the court held that: ‘This factor not 
merely rendered the information confidential, but outweighed the freedom of expression that 
would otherwise have underpinned the right of the press to publish the information.’ In B and 
A v C (2002), as noted above, the Court of Appeal, when determining whether media 
disclosures of the private lives of celebrities are in the public interest, set out guidelines for 
balancing Articles 8 and 10. These provide that press freedom is itself of public interest, 
given the role that the media play within society. They further state that courts cannot 
interfere with press freedom ‘where there is no identifiable special public interest in any 
particular material being published’. However, where there is a clear public interest in 
publication the Court of Appeal argued that this strengthened the case for publication. As 
regards public figures, the guidelines state that, although they are entitled to a private life, 
because of their public position they ‘must expect and accept that [their] actions will be more 
closely scrutinised by the media’. They further state that where public figures have ‘courted 
public attention’ they then have ‘less ground to object to the intrusion which follows’. 
In the landmark Campbell case (2004), the majority of the House of Lords found that 
there was a legitimate public interest in exposing the truth of Ms Campbell’s drug addiction 
as she had previously made public denials about it (paras 24, 58 and 151). In addition, Lord 
Hope said that the courts have to determine whether publication ‘pursues a legitimate aim and 
whether the benefits that will be achieved by its publication are proportionate to the harm that 
may be done by the interference with the right to privacy’ (para 113).  
A few weeks after this ruling, the ECtHR decided the Von Hannover case (2004), 
where it was held that there was no public interest in publishing information on the private 
life of Princess Caroline because, although she was a public figure, the ‘published photos and 
accompanying commentaries relate exclusively to details of the applicant’s private life’ (para 
64) and therefore did not ‘contribute to any debate of general interest to society’, a factor 
which the court argued should be ‘decisive’ in balancing Articles 8 and 10 (para 76). In its 
more recent judgement in Mosley v UK (2011) the ECtHR maintained the importance of the 
distinction between information that informs public debate and information that does not 
(para 112). In particular, it confirmed that tawdry, lurid or sensational reporting ‘does not 
attract the robust protection of Article 10 afforded to the press’ and it stressed that in 
assessing whether there is a public interest justifying an interference with the right to respect 
for private life, ‘the focus must be on whether the publication is in the interest of the public 
and not whether the public might be interested in reading it’ (para 114). Thus, Article 8 may 
take precedence over Article 10 where the information being disclosed is private and intimate 
and will not contribute to public debate. 
The importance of weighing the public interest was reiterated by the Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales in HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd (2006), and in 
Re BBC (Attorney-General’s Reference No 3 of 1999), Lord Phillips said, in the House of 
Lords, that the test for balancing Articles 8 and 10 had become ‘well settled’, namely 
 
whether publication of the material pursues a legitimate aim, and whether the benefits that will 
be achieved by its publication are proportionate to the harm that may be done by the 
interference with the right to privacy. (para 23) 
 
In reviewing the facts of the case, Lord Phillips concluded that the goals of disclosure of 
personal information by the BBC were legitimate as they related to crime prevention, and the 
methods adopted were proportionate to these aims. In contrast, more recent judgments 
relating to press disclosures of the details of the extramarital affairs of celebrities have held 
them not to be in pursuit of legitimate aims and hence not in the public interest (CTB v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd, 2011). 
The courts of Northern Ireland have also explored how to balance Article 8 and 10 
rights. In Callaghan v Independent News & Media Ltd (2009), the High Court distinguished 
between the public interest ‘in relation to the debate as to whether it is right to publish 
detailed information about sex offenders when they are to be released into the community and 
if so the extent of that information’ and the public interest in publishing unpixelated 
photographs of particular offenders (para 25). The court found that the publishing of the 
photographs might be detrimental to the public interest where it undermined the rehabilitation 
of offenders, and that therefore the restriction on publishing photographs was proportionate 
(para 79). Subsequently, in Lee v News Group Newspapers Ltd (2010), the High Court held 
that given the personal nature of the information in this case, concerning the life of Van 
Morrison, the public did not have a legitimate interest in the claimants’ private affairs. 
 Within the law of both England and Northern Ireland, disclosure of particularly 
sensitive information, such as the anonymity of rape complaints or the names of children who 
are party to legal proceedings, is subject to statutory reporting restrictions. However, in order 
to protect the interests of open justice, these are very limited and specific. In other cases, 
reporting restrictions are imposed only if it can be demonstrated that the relevant information 
is private and that its publication is not in the public interest. Where this is proven, the law 
provides a number of remedies, including injunctions to prevent the publication of the private 
material and damages to compensate for injury caused by prior publication. 
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